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Abstract
We develop solutions for the security and privacy of user identity information in a federation. By
federation we mean a group of organizations or service providers which have built trust among each
other and enable sharing of user identity information amongst themselves. Our solution supports a step
by step approach according to which an individual can ﬁrst establish a digital identity followed by a
secure and protected use of such identity. We ﬁrst introduce a ﬂexible approach to establish a single
sign-on (SSO) ID in a federation. Then we show how a user can leverage this SSO ID to establish
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed user identity attributes without the dependence on PKI for user authentication.
This makes the process more usable and enhances privacy. The major contribution of this paper is a
novel solution for protection against identity theft of these identity attributes. Our approach is based
on the use of zero-knowledge proof protocols and distributed hash tables. Revocation mechanisms of
the identity attributes are also developed. We illustrate how current revocation techniques can beneﬁt
from the underlying federation framework and the use of distributed hash tables. Finally, we formally
prove correctness and provide complexity results for our protocols. The complexity results show that our
approach is efﬁcient. In the paper we also show that the protocol is robust enough even in the case of
semi-trusted “honest-yet curious” service providers, thus preventing against insider threat. We believe that
the approach represents a precursor to new and innovative cryptographic techniques which can provide
solutions for the security and privacy problems in federated identity management.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection-Cryptographic
Controls, K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: Security and Protection
General Terms: Security, access control.
Keywords: Identity management, single sign-on, federation, identity theft, zero knowledge proof, dis-
tributed hash tables, revocation.I. INTRODUCTION
Digital identity corresponds to the electronic information associated with an individual in a particular
identity system. Identity systems are used by online service providers (SP) to authenticate and authorize
users to services protected by access control policies. With the advent of distributed computing models
such as web services, there are increased inter-dependencies among such SP’s. As a result, the current
trend [24], [25] is to focus on inter-organization and inter-dependent management of identity information
[35] rather than identity management solutions for internal use. This is referred to as federated iden-
tity management. Federated identity is a distributed computing construct that recognizes the fact that
individuals move between corporate boundaries at an increasingly frequent rate. Practical applications
of federated identities are represented by large multinational companies which have to manage several
heterogeneous systems at the same time [35], or by good computing systems in which scientists need to
access a large number of machines at different institutions in order to perform computationally intensive
tasks. An effort in this sense is represented by the notion of Single Sign-On (SSO) [40], which enables
a user to login to multiple organizations or SP’s by using the same username and password. This
approach increases usability by reducing the number of passwords that need to be managed.However,
there are several important security considerations, as SSO system may introduce a single point-of-failure.
Therefore techniques like strong authentication should be implemented for a secure SSO system.
Emerging standards [24], [25] extend the notion of federated identity to other user information referred
to as identity attributes. The main goal of such extensions is to enable interoperability and link together
redundant user identities maintained by different SP’s. An important requirement in this context is that
the federation environment should enable SP’s to exchange user data in a secure and trustworthy manner
while also enforcing the original privacy preferences of users. Current federation solutions are built on
top of SAML1 speciﬁcation which depends on PKI with additional trust relationships for its security.
As such, federations have to rely on PKI for exchanging data among SP’s, and between users and SP’s
authentication systems [35]. However, PKI has experienced numerous implementation problems because
of its technical complexities. It is also oriented towards strong identity granted through Registration and
Certiﬁcation Authorities, which is not always suitable for user privacy. Hence, the assumption of relying
on PKI for all types of interaction in the federation is not realistic. We thus need articulated identity
solutions supporting multiple complementary options for digital identity.
A serious concern related with identity management, whatever solution is chosen, is the risk of identity
1Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
1theft. Despite the guidelines that have been provided on how to protect against identity theft [28], not
many identity theft protection solutions have been proposed so far. Sensitive information in the Internet is
currently hard to track and also consistent usage of the proposed solutions is extremely hard to achieve.
We believe however that in a federation environment it is possible to develop protocols able to achieve
identity theft protection. As noted above, the security and privacy of the user identity information, both
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed, are of utmost importance today. Security prevents theft and impersonation when
the identity attributes are used and privacy protects against the disclosure of identity when the user has
the right or expectation of anonymity [27].
In this paper we propose a ﬂexible approach to assign unique identiﬁers to users within a federation
employing SSO ID’s with strong guarantees against identity theft. To assure user privacy, our protocols do
not rely on PKI for user authentication, so that one can easily use uncertiﬁed attributes and be eligible for
services with low clearance. For cases in which certiﬁcates are required we show how SP’s can leverage
the SSO ID to issue certiﬁcates to users. We also show how we can easily employ PKI protocols if a
PKI infrastructure is available.
The core of our federated approach for identity management is a set of cryptographic protocols
speciﬁcally designed to protect user attributes against identity theft. The key idea is to associate the
different kinds of sensitive information of a user with each other and with the user’s SSO ID. In such
way, any of such sensitive information is not acceptable without one or more of the other associated
identifying information. We refer to a set of such sensitive information as attributes Secured from Identity
Theft (SIT attributes for brevity). Under our approach, SIT attributes are protected : if a user wants to
use any of his/her SIT attributes, he/she has to give along one or more other SIT attributes as proofs
of identity. We show how we can preserve user privacy without jeopardizing security with the help of
cryptographic techniques like zero knowledge proofs [20], [41] and distributed hash tables [30]. The
use of zero knowledge protocols makes it possible to hide user values of the proofs of identity even to
entities like SP registrars2. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time a cryptographic solution to
the problem of identity theft has been proposed in the context of federated digital identity management.
The correctness of SIT attributes also signiﬁcantly depends on the revocation mechanisms employed. We
provide revocation techniques for SIT attributes and illustrate how current revocation techniques [22],
[23], [33] can beneﬁt from the underlying federation framework and the use of distributed hash tables.
2If a user trusts an SP to store his/her hidden SIT attributes then that SP is the registrar for that user. More details on this
are given in Section IV.
2A federation environment inherently protects user attributes more than an open environment. However it
is usually assumed that all entities in the federation are completely trusted. In our solution we show how
the protocol is robust enough even in the case in which semi-trusted “honest-yet curious” SP’s are in
place. In the paper we also formally prove correctness of our protocols and provide complexity results;
these results show that our approach is very efﬁcient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce preliminary
concepts and deﬁnitions concerning digital identity in a federation. In particular, in Section II-B we
illustrate the approach we adopt to establish digital identity in a federation for both servers and users.
In Section III we show how certiﬁcates are issued and used in the federation. Section IV gives detailed
description of our solution to the problem of identity theft with the help of a running example. In particular
Section IV-A gives the basic registration protocol for establishing SIT attributes. This is followed by
protocols for SIT attributes usage in Section IV-B and duplicate registration detection in Section IV-C. In
Section V we present the revocation mechanism for the different types of SIT attributes. In Section VI
we give the formal analysis for the correctness of the protocols and the complexity analysis. In Sections
VII and VIII we discuss related work and we outline some conclusions, respectively.
II. DIGITAL IDENTITY IN FEDERATIONS
In this section we present preliminary concepts related with identity. We ﬁrst brieﬂy review the notion
of identity and possible identifying techniques. Then, we present the identity system we have devised,
focusing on the approaches we adopt for identifying both users and SP’s.
A. Preliminary Concepts and Deﬁnitions
A federation is a group of organizations which trust certain kinds of information from any member of
the group to be valid. In this paper we consider federations involving two types of entities: SP’s and users.
A SP is an entity providing one or more services to users within the federation. Services are protected
by a set of rules deﬁning the requirements users have to satisfy in order to use the service. Often such
requirements are expressed as conditions against properties of users. Such properties are usually encoded
by means of attributes or credentials.
To interact with the federation, users need to be identiﬁed. Identiﬁcation is the process of mapping
claimed or observed attributes of an individual to his/her associated identiﬁer. Identiﬁers can be either
encoded using attributes or certiﬁcates, or they might be user’s knowledge (i.e., passwords, etc). Identiﬁers
are assigned to users by an identity system. Identiﬁers can be classiﬁed into weak and strong identiﬁers. A
3strong identiﬁer uniquely identiﬁes an individual in a population 3, while a weak identiﬁer can be applied
to many individuals in a population. Whether an identiﬁer is strong or weak depends upon the size of the
population and the uniqueness of the identifying attribute. Multiple weak identiﬁers may lead to a unique
identiﬁcation [46]. Examples of strong identiﬁers are a user’s passport or social security number. Weak
identiﬁers are attributes like age and gender. The types of possible identiﬁers and their organization are
summarized in Figure 1. In the remainder of the paper when mentioning identiﬁers we will always refer
to strong identiﬁers, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
An identity system should satisfy some requirements related with identiﬁcation and authentication of the
identiﬁed users. Identiﬁcation ensuresaccountability of the users and the ultimate goal is to authorize users
to obtain required services and/or data by SP’s. By authentication we mean the process of establishing
conﬁdence in the truth of some claim.Authorization is the process of ensuring that the policies specifying
who may execute which actions on which resources are followed. Authorization decisions do not require
the unique identity of the requester to enforce policies. Finally, accountability is the ability to associate
a consequence with a past action of an individual [36]. It is required that the individual can be linked to
action or event for which he/she is to be held accountable. Unlike authorization, accountability requires
the ability to uniquely identify the individual.
One of the most common approaches for authenticating the website of an enterprise in today’s world
is the use of public keys. Trusted commercial entities like Thwate and Verisign, certify that a given
public key belongs to that enterprise. Following this practice, we assume that the SP’s use the public
key infrastructure (PKI). Public keys are thus used to identify and authenticate any SP throughout the
federation. Although this approach is adequate for SP’s, it is not however suitable for users. Indeed,
the management of digital identity by means of user certiﬁcates has proven to be very difﬁcult [44].
The two principles identiﬁed in [2] namely the “least revealing means” and “most convenient” help in
understanding the reasons for such failure. Conforming to them one might selectively reveal elements of
his/her identity. First, the “least revealing means” principle implies that the minimal identity information
should be provided by the user to complete a particular transaction. Second, the “most convenient means”
principle implies that a user would selectively reveal the combination of identifying information that are
most convenient. Here the information should not exceed an upper bound of the amount of information
the user is willing to reveal. The use of PKI does not satisfy the least revealing means principle because it
associates a unique identiﬁer with the user. This could possibly be used as an instrument of surveillance on
3This is with respect to the domain in which the user is being identiﬁed.
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the user’s online activity hence compromising his/her privacy. Furthermore PKI suffers from compatibility
issues which makes it difﬁcult for the user to ﬁrst establish the different keys and then use it for the
various applications. Therefore PKI does not satisfy the most convenient means principle as well. As a
result of the above shortcomings PKI is not adopted for user identiﬁcation in the paper.
B. Establishing Unique Identiﬁers
In this section we focus on the approach adopted to uniquely identify entities in a federation, distin-
guishing among SP’s and users.
Service Providers
SP’s within a federation are identiﬁed uniquely by their public keys. We denote the two keys
belonging to each service provider as K SPPub and K SPPriv, denoting public and private key,
respectively. SP’s are also responsible for verifying user attributes and issuing digital certiﬁcates
to certify them. Therefore, each SP also has an additional public key shared with all the providers
in the federation, which is used to verify user’s certiﬁed attributes issued byany SP. The shared
public key can be generated by using group key algorithms [15] and can be used to identify
any SP belonging to the federation. We denote this public key as KFED and the corresponding
private key as K SPFedPriv. Note that, according to the protocols in [15] each SP has a different
K SPFedPriv associated with the public key KFED.
Users
A user digital identity is basically a set of his/her identiﬁers. In our work, we employ single
sign-on (SSO) ID’s to uniquely identify users within a federation. Users afﬁliated 4 with a SP
4By afﬁliated users we mean users who have repeated interactions with one or more SP’s in a federation and are interested
in a continuous relationship with the federation as opposed to external users who have only random interactions and are not
interested in establishing a relationship with the federation.
5are identiﬁed by their name and the SP name, separated by symbol$. That is, if Alice is a user
afﬁliated with SP1, her SSO ID would beAlice$SP1. Users receive their ID’s when joining the
federation. We assume all sharable attributes of registered users to be certiﬁed and stored at the
member SP they are afﬁliated with. External users can also join the federation by establishing
their SSO user name and password with any SP within the federation. For example, if some
user Bob wants to establish a SSO ID in the federation, Bob sends a request to SP1 with any
desired user name Bob. If this user name does not already exist in SP1, SP1 registers Bob
giving him the SSO ID Bob@SP1. Note that other user naming mechanisms could be used
here. The essential property is that a user SSO ID be unique within the federation.
Once the user has successfully established a SSO ID in the federation, he/she can then establish
different types of digital attributes. The SP services that a user can be eligible for depend on the service
policy enforced by the SP and the corresponding attributes the user has. In this paper we consider three
types of attributes (see Figure 2): 1) uncertiﬁed attributes, corresponding to voluntary information given
by user; 2) certiﬁed attributes, corresponding to attributes that have been veriﬁed and issued as signed
digital certiﬁcates by trusted SP’s or CA’s; and 3) attributes secured from identity theft (SIT attributes,
for brevity) corresponding to identity attributes that are relevant for the user identiﬁcation and thus need
to be secured by our protection mechanism. Using his/her SSO ID the user can log on to different SP’s
and access the provided services. Here, different scenarios may arise. In case the user does not have any
useful certiﬁed attributes, he/she can access services for which only voluntary user information needs to
be provided.
For services requiring higher clearance and thus requiring certiﬁed information from the user, the user
has to be issued the required certiﬁcates from either the SP’s or third party trusted authorities. The third
and most interesting scenario is when the user requires access to a given service with protection against
identity theft for the user identity attributes that are to be supplied to get access to the service according
the the service policies. These attributes can be both certiﬁed or uncertiﬁed. Protection of the identity
attributes against identity theft is of course in the best interest for any user. However, also SP’s may
want to offer reliable and secure services and thus interested in requiring that user attributes be protected
against theft. We elaborate in each of the above cases in the rest of the paper.
III. USAGE OF CERTIFICATES
For a user to be authorized for a service, the SP may require some certiﬁed identity information.
Certiﬁed information is encoded as certiﬁcates issued by SP’s within the federation or by external CA’s.
6Upon federation setting, it is agreed that the SP’s will follow an acceptable well deﬁned procedure for the
veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation of different attributes. These certiﬁcates will be considered reliable within
the federation.
A. Certiﬁcate Provisioning
Certiﬁcate provisioning refers to the process of obtaining some certiﬁed attributes. In order to obtain
certiﬁcates usable in the federation the user has to assure that his/her uncertiﬁed attributes and claims are
veriﬁed by any trusted SP or CA. We employ two basic approaches for veriﬁcation. The ﬁrst approach
addresses the case in which a user that does not possess any initial digital certiﬁcate. In such case it is
inevitable that the user has to go to a physical location to register any strong identiﬁer. If for example
Alice, who does not have any digital certiﬁcate, needs a certiﬁcate asserting thatAlice SSN is her social
security number (SSN), she has to show it to an authorized personnel in a physical ofﬁce at a SP (say
SP1). As a result, she gets a signed digital identity which asserts that Alice SSN belongs to user-id
Alice@SP1.
The second approach is used when a user either already has some digital certiﬁcates, or the claimed
information can be veriﬁed by accessing some reliable online databases. Additional certiﬁcates can be
issued based on this information. We assume that certiﬁcate provisioning policies are in place at the
SP. SP’s can issue certiﬁcates to users depending on user properties and the certiﬁcate provisioning
policies. SP can also issue a special type of certiﬁcate which attests the ownership of other certiﬁcates.
These certiﬁcates certifyingcredential ownership can actually help associate user attributes from different
certiﬁcates. An example to illustrate this is as follows:
Example 1 Figure 3 demonstrates an example for the issuance of certiﬁcate that denotes credential
ownership. As shown, user Alice has two certiﬁcates. The ﬁrst certiﬁcate is issued by a SP and states
that Alice@SP1 has SSN Alice SSN. The second certiﬁcate is from a trusted CA and states that AliceSSN
has a Low Income Status, (LIS) for brevity. Alice wants to get a certiﬁcate stating that she (represented
by her SSO identiﬁer) has aLIS to be used within the federation without revealing her SSN. Alice can
obtain such certiﬁcate by submitting a trusted SP theLIS certiﬁcate and the certiﬁcate associating her
SSN with her SSO ID. In return she obtains the ﬁnal certiﬁcate associating Alice@SP1 with LIS. Here,
the actual disclosure of the SSN is not required, but just needs to be the same for the two certiﬁcates.
LIS is signed by the private group key K-SPFedPriv of the issuing trusted SP and can be veriﬁed by
any SP in the federation.
7An additional example showing the certiﬁcate issuance based on certiﬁcate provisioning policies is as
follows:
Example 2 When a user requires the issuance of new certiﬁcates, he/she must prove possession of pre-
requisite certiﬁcates according to the certiﬁcate provisioning policies of SP’s. If Alice@SP1 has the
certiﬁcate associating the SSO ID with her SSN, she may be eligible to obtain aTrusted-User certiﬁcate.
In this case the certiﬁcate provisioning policy the service provider may require Alice to be uniquely
identiﬁed to be accountable and hence get the Trusted-User certiﬁcate.
As shown by the example above, when a user requires the issuance of new certiﬁcates, he/she must
prove possession of pre-requisite certiﬁcates according to the certiﬁcate provisioning policies of SP’s.
The user should also satisfy the federation requirements concerning the provisioning of certiﬁcates stating
a claim for users. Note that in the example unique identiﬁcation is required for accountability purposes.
However, this condition is not always needed for accountability if pseudonymous systems are employed
[11], [12], [13], [14].
B. Sharing User Attributes
In [8] we have shown how a user can negotiate with SP’s to submit the appropriate certiﬁcates and
attributes in order to obtain the requested service. The key idea is that if the user has agreed to share
this information within the federation, the SP’s would negotiate these sharable user attributes amongst
themselves. Such an approach enhances user convenience and system usability that the user does not
have.Attribute sharing can be achieved efﬁciently and with privacy guarantees. By using trust negotiation
techniques [7] only minimal information about users is required to satisfy the requesting SP’s service
policy. If not, the privacy of the attributes may be vulnerable as they would reside in multiple locations
within a federation of which some locations might not be trusted by the user. The use of tickets namely
trust tickets and session tickets has been shown to be critical in order to determine the user’s past activities
and related information in the federation.
If the user does not want to share his sensitive identiﬁers, he/she can directly negotiate with the SP
to provide this information when required. The above approach can be used by our identity system
for privacy preserving sharing of user identity attributes. We can also use the standard attribute sharing
protocols as given in [24], [25].
8IV. PROTECTION FROM IDENTITY THEFT
Identity theft occurs when a malicious person uses an honest user’s personal information such as the
users name, Social Security number (SSN), credit card number (CCN) or other identifying information,
without his/her permission. In this section we offer one solution to prevent identity theft in a federation.
As deﬁned in the introduction we refer to the protected sensitive information as attributes secured from
identity theft (SIT attributes for brevity). Our approach is similar to real world situations where a user
is asked for different kinds of sensitive personal information to be assured that the user is really who
he/she claims to be. However, in online transactions with different SP’s it is desirable that one be able to
prove the possession of a sensitive information without the actual revelation of this information in clear.
Our security model consists of two main entities in the federation, that is, users and SP’s. SP’s can
also act as registrars for certain users. If a user trusts an SP to store his/her SIT attributes, then that SP is
the registrar for that user. A key feature of our approach is that we avoid the use of a centralized registrar
entity, thus being consistent with the truly distributed nature of protocols in the federation. Registrars
are assumed to be semi-honest5 for the user attributes they keep track of. A user can register his/her
SIT attributes with any SP in the federation engaging a bootstrapping procedure. Once the registration
is completed, a set of SIT attributes are associated with the user SSO ID and with each other. These
attributes are used together with ordinary data to protect from identity theft. Here, and throughout the
paper, by protection against identity theft we mean the inability to use a SIT attribute without the proof
of additional identity information. To protect against identity theft, it is important that an adversary be
prevented from registering as its own SIT attributes of other users; therefore our security model includes
mechanisms to detect duplicates within a federation. We provide a detailed presentation of the techniques
and algorithms above introduced in the following sections.
For the purposes of clarity we ﬁrst introduce a running example which is used in the following sections.
Example 3 User Alice has established an ID in the federation namely Alice@SP1. She intends to use
her CCN and wants to protect it against identity theft. To do this she registers her SSN and CCN with the
SP SPreg. Now, within the federation her CCN is not valid unless she provides information regarding her
SSN as registered earlier. So when another SP providing a service, say SPprov, asks for her CCN, ﬁrst
her SSN information has to be validated. Following that the CCN information can be used with SPprov
successfully. Even if Alice uses her sensitive SSN as a proof of identity she still does not want to reveal
5According to the accepted deﬁnition of semi-honest entities, we assume registrars will follow the protocol but may also want
to learn more information than they are supposed to.
9this information to the SP’s in clear.
A. Bootstrapping: Registration Procedure
Since a SP is not considered completely trustworthy, the values of the sensitive attributes are not to be
released in clear. The main goal of registration is thus to store unique and hidden sensitive SIT attributes
to such semi-honest SP’s. In the next subsections we describe the two alternative registration procedures
we have devised.
1) Physical Registration: This type of registration requires the user to go to a SP in order to register
his/her sensitive identiﬁers and attributes in person. Following from Example 3, Alice wants to register
her SSN and CCN with SP SPreg. An authorized ofﬁcer of SPreg veriﬁes the actual a = SSN and
b = CCN with the physical cards or certiﬁed papers. Then he/she lets Alice enter these values in an
ofﬂine dual screen computer (or some special purpose device) such that the ofﬁcer monitors with the help
of the second screen that Alice enters the correct values. Such computer calculates g¡amod p with tag
SSNtag and g¡bmod p with tag CCNtag. Given the calculated value it is not computationally feasible
for an attacker to get the secret values assuming the intractability of Discrete Log Problem (DLP). These
values are stored with the user at SPreg with the corresponding user id, that ism Alice@SP1. Here we
assume that the ofﬁcer is trusted and does not keep a copy of the sensitive information. The device itself
is assumed to be trusted and tamperproof. We do not further elaborate on this aspect since it is outside
the scope of this paper.
Physical registration is the strongest and sometimes the most reliable form of identiﬁcation. However,
referring to our principles introduced in Section II-A, even though this method reveals a minimal amount
of information, it is not always the most convenient procedure. We therefore look into the second kind
of registration which is executed through online message exchange.
2) Online Registration: Online registration of sensitive attributes is challenging in the absence of user
public keys or any electronic certiﬁed information. To achieve the goal of privacy, we require that sensitive
information of the user are never given in clear to even the SP storing this information. Of course this
requirement adds a level of complexity to the whole registration procedure: the SP cannot guarantee
that the information registered is correct, but it can guarantee that the user knows the secret information
whose exponentiated value is stored with it. To reach this last goal the SP and the user engage in a zero
knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPOK) as given shortly. To understand the former concern consider
three cases following from Example 3. The ﬁrst case corresponds to the ideal situation, that is, Alice
is honest and submits correct values of the sensitive attributes. The second case is when Alice submits
10a random value instead of the SSN and tags it with SSNtag. If no one other than Alice knows the
random correct value, this works perfectly ﬁne. This is because in this case the proof of identity is not
something you have, it is something you know (Please refer to Figure 1). However if the actual value of
the SSN is required to be given in clear and has to be veriﬁed by an external third party, then Alice’s
transaction will fail. The ﬁnal case is when a malicious user, say Carl, tries to register Alice’s SSN.
Now if Alice has already registered her SSN, the attempt by Carl would be detected by the federation
as explained in a Section IV-C. If Alice has not registered this attribute and tries to register it later an
alarm would be raised. The alarm would then trigger an auditing procedure to determine which user has
already registered the SSN of Alice and a subsequent recovery procedure that will undo the registration
made by Carl. Preventing a malicious user to register using any other identity when the actual user has
not registered is a major issue. Several approaches are possible to avoid this problem. One possibility
is to mandate that at the time of registration the user provides the strong identiﬁers indicated by the
policy of the registrar. Since our approach is based on multi-factor, a minimum number of attributes will
be needed to actively participate in the federation. The exact type and numbers of attributes to register
is part of the registrar policy and is to be published at the registrar site. For example, a registrar may
require that the user submits at least three strong identiﬁers before he/she is enrolled in the federation.
The registrar will have to validate these strong identiﬁers before the registration is completed. A policy
language for expressing enrollment conditions needs to be deployed.
A more effective approach might be that of providing besides face-to-face registration on-line registra-
tion based on “digital introduction” of members. The idea is to allow on-line registration for users showing
identity assertions issued by other federated members previously registered using physical registration.
The rationale is that if the member user is trusted and his/her identity known to the federation he/she can
be the grantor of the identity of the new incoming member. Of course, this approach requires the member
to be sufﬁciently trusted. Also, it implies the use of PKI for signing the identity assertions. In case of
detected identity theft from the granted member, the grantor can be held accountable of the attack. We
plan to pursue the above two mechanisms as future work to support ﬂexible and secure enrollments. An
important issue that will be investigated in such context is the support of enrollments characterized by
different identity assurance.
The general ZKPOK’s [20] is explained as follows. The protocol allows a committer to have a private
secret, and prove its possession without releasing it. The committer releases some information called the
commitment. The protocol has two main properties: hiding, the veriﬁer cannot compute the secret from
11the commitment; and binding, the committer cannot change his mind after having committed, but it can
later open the commitment to reveal the secret to convince the veriﬁer that this was indeed the original
value it was committed to.
We use Schnorr’s ZKPOK to commit the supposedly sensitive information as given in Protocol 1.
Following from Example 3, if Alice wants to commit her SSN= a then she commits the value c =
g¡amod p to SPreg. Using the protocol she can prove that she knows the value a corresponding to the
commitment. Similarly, she can commit other sensitive values.
Protocol 1 SIT Registration: Schnorr’s Zero Knowledge Protocol
Require: Federation System Parameters: p;q;g such that qjp¡1, and g is an order q element in Zp¤. t is a security
parameter. User has a valid SSO ID uid, Service Provider SPreg is a member of the Federation. Time stamps
Ti can be generated.
Goal: User knows the secret a of the committed value c which is registered with SPreg.
1: User ! SPreg : c = g¡amod p, uid;T1
2: User ! SPreg : d = grmod p fUser selects r from [1::q]g,uid;T2
3: SPreg ! User : e fSPreg selects e from [1::2t]g
4: User ! SPreg : y = r + ea mod q, uid;T3
5: SPreg : if d = gy ¤ cemod p then return OK
At the end of the registration procedure in Example 3 the registrar SPreg has the information as given
in Table I. We now describe how the SIT attributes, that are registered through either the bootstrapping
Tag Committed Value Registration Procedure
SSNtag g¡a In Person, T1
CCNtag g¡b Online, T2
TABLE I
INFORMATION REGISTERED FOR ALICE AT SP1
(Refer example 1).
or the registration procedure, are used in the federation to protect against identity theft.
B. Using SIT Attributes to Protect Against Identity Theft
The main aim of the protocols we present here is to make the use of SIT attributes possible only under
the submission of a subset of additional SIT attributes which have been registered. The exact subset of
the additional SIT attributes required is determined based on the user and/or SP’s identiﬁcation policy.
Such attributes act as a proofs of identity and enable association of required SIT attributes with the other
registered SIT attributes. This gives assurance that the user is in control of his/her sensitive attributes and
is therefore honest. The solution we have devised to deal with identity theft consists of two main phases.
12The ﬁrst and key phase is aZKPOK and symmetric key exchange protocol. Here the user proves that
he/she knows the actual value of a speciﬁed SIT attribute without revealing its value in clear. In addition,
at the end of a successful run of this protocol the user and SP share a single symmetric key related to the
proof of knowledge of that SIT attribute. With repeated runs of this protocol multiple symmetric keys
can be shared. These keys are used to retrieve the required SIT attributes from the ﬁnal message given
by the user to the SP. Creation of the ﬁnal messageis the second phase of the solution. Here, the user
creates a message encrypted in a nested manner with the symmetric keys generated in the ﬁrst phase.
Next we elaborate on these two phases in detail.
Protocol 2 ZKPOK and single symmetric key exchange
Require: Federation System Parameters: p;q;g such that qjp¡1, and g is an order q element in Zp¤. t is a security
parameter. User has a valid SSO ID uid and has registered his/her attributes with Service Provider SPreg and
wants service from SPprov. Both the SP0s are members of the Federation. Time stamps Ti can be generated.
Goal: SPprov veriﬁes correctly thatUser knows the value a registered with SPreg to retrieve the key k.
1: User ! SPprov : msg fmsg = SPreg has my (uid) commitment for secret for tag-of-ag, T1
2: SPprov $ SPreg : c fretrieves c = g¡amod p corresponding to tag-of-a and user-idg
3: User ! SPprov : d = grmod p fUser selects r from [1::q]g, uid;T2
4: SPprov ! User : e fSPprov selects e from [1::2t]g
5: User ! SPprov : y = r + ea mod q, y0 = r + ea + x mod q, fx is a random such that k = d(gx ¡ 1)g,
uid;T3
6: SPprov : veriﬁesd = gy ¤ cemod p and evaluates key f(gy
0
¤ ce) ¡ dgmod p = k
The ZKPOK and symmetric key sharing is given in Protocol 2. There are three entities involved in
this protocol; namely the user, the SP from which the user wants service, denoted as SPprov, and the
SP which registered the SIT attributes of the user, denoted as SPreg. In step 1 the user lets SPprov
know that SPreg has his/her committed values. Then in step 2 SPprov conﬁrms this claim withSPreg
and gets the required commitments corresponding to the SIT attributes as proofs of identity and required
SIT attributes. Similar to Schnorr’s protocol in steps 3,4 and 5 the user generates a proof depending
on the random challenge sent by SPprov. The main difference is in step 5 where the user calculates y0
depending on the random symmetric key k. Here x is randomly chosen so that the resulting key is also
random. For the standard symmetric ciphers there is a short list of weak keys which are avoided at this
step. The weak keys are mainly the keys with predicatable patterns like “0000..” or “010101”. The user
also generates y to prove it knows the value of the commitment like the original proof in Protocol 1. In
step 6, SPprov veriﬁes the claim and retrieves the symmetric key generated by the user in step 5.SPprov
can get the key k only if it knows the value of the secret commitment stored in SPreg. This protocol is
repeated in order to obtain a symmetric key as a proof of knowledge for each SIT attribute required.
13Fig. 4. Final message format from Alice to SPprov. Refer example 1
Once the symmetric keys are generated and shared, the user creates the ﬁnal message. If there aren
SIT attributes required as proofs of identity and m SIT attributes required for satisfying the requested
service policy, then Protocol 2 is run N = n+m times resulting in N symmetric keys. The ﬁnal message
is encrypted N times in a nested manner. The required information is revealed only in the inner-most
encrypted portion. As a clarifying example we show in Figure 4 the format of ﬁnal message thatAlice
would give to SPprov in Example 3. Through 2 iterations of Protocol 2, the keys KSSN and KCCN
are retrieved. M0 is the main message sent to SPprov which is encrypted with the SP’s public key. By
reading this message SPprov knows it has to use KSSN to open one layer of encryption thus retrieving
the deciphered version of M1. It now knows it has to use KCCN to get the ﬁnal value, that is, CCN.
SPprov can also conﬁrm at this point that this corresponds to the value committed toSPreg which it
received during the last run of Protocol 2.
C. Identifying Duplicates of SIT attributes
During registration it is very important to verify if the proposed commitments of sensitive attributes
are already registered in the federation. Such veriﬁcation is to prevent a malicious user from registering
stolen SIT attribute values with his/her credentials. Therefore to prevent duplicates the responsible SP
should check with all other SP’s if the proposed commitment of a sensitive attribute is already present.
Such a check can be executed incrementally or via a broadcast and it can be very expensive. We therefore
propose the use of distributed hash tables (DHT)[30] for this purpose.
A DHT has no central server and partitions a key space among n servers. Each distributed server
has partial list of where data is stored in the system and the keys are uniformly mapped to the servers
according to rules speciﬁed by the federation. A “lookup” algorithm is required to locate data given
the key for that data. There are two main functions for handling the data, namely put(key;data) and
get(key).
For our purposes the DHT is used as follows. The unique identiﬁer or the key for the DHT is the
commitment c = g¡a as given in Protocol 1. The key space therefore has the range [0::p¡1] and the data
is the tuple (user-ID;TAG; Type-of-Registration). Because a federation is a closed system, there is
14Fig. 5. Steps for certiﬁed SIT attribute revocation in a
push mode.
Fig. 6. New DHT for SIT attribute revocation in a pull
mode.
an inherent trust amongst the SP’s; therefore we can use the SP’s for storing and retrieving the values
[29]. During the formation of the federation a range of key values are given to each SP which will be
responsible for storing the given keys and the corresponding data values. This is in addition to the SP
with which the user had registered in the ﬁrst place. When a user wants to register his/her attributes
with an SP, that SP executes the lookup algorithm to ﬁnd if any duplicate is present. If a duplicate is
present then an alarm is raised that triggers a procedure that determines the compromise of the sensitive
attribute. Otherwise, ﬁrst the SP registers the users commitments. Following that, depending on the range
the committed value belongs to, the appropriate SP is given this key and the corresponding data. This
replication adds to the robustness and security of the DHT’s. As a result, we claim that by using the
DHT’s we can prevent duplication of registered sensitive identiﬁers, which is crucial to ensure effective
protection against identity theft.
V. REVOCATION OF SIT ATTRIBUTES
Digital attributes state certain well deﬁned properties about the subjects they refer to. Such attributes
may be indeﬁnitely valid, or may be valid for a given time interval. Also, attributes may be revoked if
some external events compromising their validity occur. Revocation thus refers to the undo of the claim
associated with an attribute. Events that may cause attributes revocation include [22]:
² Compromising of the owner key: The owner key linked to this certiﬁcate has been compromised.
² Compromising of the issuer key: The issuer key used to generate this certiﬁcate has been compro-
mised.
² Owner changed afﬁliation: The identiﬁcation details of the certiﬁcate are no longer valid.
² Obsolescence of the certiﬁcate: The certiﬁcate is superseded by another certiﬁcate.
15² Certiﬁcate terminated: The certiﬁcate has reached the end of its validity period and has not been
renewed.
A. Preliminary Notions Concerning Revocation
Most of the work in the area of revocation has focused on the revocation of certiﬁed attributes or public
key certiﬁcates [45]. A widely used standard for deﬁning these digital certiﬁcates is the X.509 [23] format.
The two most popular schemes which have been proposed to manage X.509 certiﬁcate revocations are
Certiﬁcation Revocation Lists (CRL’s) [22] and Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) [33]. Both aim
at providing risk analysis based on certiﬁcate usage and efﬁcient notiﬁcation about the validity status
of the certiﬁcate. CRL is essentially a list of certiﬁcate serial numbers which have been revoked and
are therefore no longer valid. The CRL is always issued by the CA which issued the corresponding
certiﬁcates. A PKI-enabled application consults this CRL to verify the validity of the certiﬁcate prior
to its use. Due to its centralized nature, CRL is not scalable and also requires huge bandwidth in order
to communicate with all its clients. OCSP supersedes CRL’s by providing efﬁcient notiﬁcation, through
the use of a distributed protocol. A typical OCSP deﬁnes a request-response protocol between OCSP
client and an OCSP responder. The OCSP responder is a trusted entity that informs the requester about
the validity information of the certiﬁcates. The OCSP responder can contact various backends including
CRL’s to retrieve the revocation information. One issue with OCSP is that the requester must know which
OCSP responder to query. This information is typically speciﬁed in the Authority Info Access (AIA)
extension of a certiﬁcate [33]. One limitation regarding the use of AIA extension is that it might give rise
to deployment problems caused by the increased size of the certiﬁcate. Moreover one has to ensure that
there are no compatibility issues because of the different versions or types of certiﬁcates using the AIA
extension. The problem of ﬁnding OCSP responders can be elegantly solved in a federated environment
with the help of DHT’s and with an optional use of AIA extension. Another more important limitation of
OCSP, and indeed any current revocation mechanism, is that it cannot be used for uncertiﬁed attributes.
This is because there is no assigned CA which can revoke such attribute. We leverage the federation
architecture and follow a policy based approach for uncertiﬁed attributes. We assume that the revocation
status is essentially provided by either the uncertiﬁed attribute’s owner, or it is the result of the feedback
of other federation entities.
A comprehensive description of the revocation mechanisms for the various types of attributes is given
in the next subsection. We show how the underlying collaborative environment of a federation provides
opportunities for efﬁcient solutions to the problem of attribute revocation.
16B. Revocation of SIT Attributes
The SIT attributes introduced in this paper are useful only if they can be veriﬁed and revoked reliably
when necessary. Generally speaking, revocation techniques should enable efﬁcient notiﬁcation to the
potential consumer of the revoked attributes and prevent its subsequent usage. When and how should a
SIT attribute be revoked depends on the type of the SIT attribute. As elaborated earlier, there are two
types of SIT attributes, namely certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed (see Figure 2), which require different approaches
to revocation. Precisely the adopted approaches are described as follows:
Certiﬁed SIT Attributes. Certiﬁed SIT attributes should be revoked when the original issuer
of the certiﬁcate (external CA, or an internal federation SP) disqualiﬁes that certiﬁcate. This
corresponds to the credential revocation criteria already well investigated [16], [23].
Referring to Example 1, consider the case when SPprov checks for the validity of Alice’s
CCN with the appropriate external CA and is notiﬁed that thisCCN certiﬁcate is revoked. As
a consequence of this notiﬁcation, revocation steps have to be taken to update the information in
the federation as shown in Figure 5. At step 3 SPprov sends a signed revocation message to SPreg
with the SSO Id Alice@SP1 and the tag CCNtag. Based on this SPreg can retrieve Alice’s
identity record (see Table I). Now SPreg can either remove the row corresponding to CCNtag
or add an additional column to record the status information as revoked and ﬁnally nullify the
‘Committed Value’. In both the cases the commitment which is requisite for establishing proof
of ownership of the corresponding SIT attribute is removed. Since an SIT attribute cannot be
used without a valid proof as shown in Section IV-B, subsequent usage of the revoked SIT
attribute is prevented. This is the identity record update corresponding to step 4 in the ﬁgure.
In addition to updating the attribute information at the local registrar the DHT node saving
the attribute commitment also has to be updated. This is because duplicate should be detected
only for valid and unique identiﬁers. If an identiﬁer has been revoked the federation policy
may allow the re-registration of revoked attribute or not. Therefore in step 5 SPreg sends a
revocation message to SPdht which is the DHT node saving CCN commitment. Depending on
the revocation policy, SPdht can either simply delete this information from its hash table or it
can add the revocation information in the value corresponding to the commitment key. The
update of the DHT node(s) completes the revocation process.
Uncertiﬁed SIT Attributes. Uncertiﬁed attributes correspond to voluntary claims of individuals
which do not have to be signed or veriﬁed by any trusted authority. Here the user itself is the
17issuer of the SIT attribute. Therefore the trust in the claim is often considered uncritical. However
serious security problems, like spam, phishing and pharming [17], [21], [38] attacks, arise from
the incorrect usage of the uncertiﬁed attributes. It should thus be possible to revoke the usage of
uncertiﬁed attributes. To the best our knowledge, revocation of uncertiﬁed attributes has never
been explored.
Determining when uncertiﬁed attributes should be revoked is more complex than certiﬁed
attributes because there is no entity who can assert accurately the validity of such attributes.
However we assume that if a number of distinct revocation assertions are received for a certain
attribute then the attribute is to be revoked. The number of accumulated assertions should
be greater than a certain threshold, determined by the federation security policy. For example
consider the case that user Alice subscribes her claimed email address phony@myemail:com to
SP1, SP2 and SP3. Eventually due to bounced emails each of the SP concludes that the email
is invalid. To revoke such attribute they separately send revocation requests to the designated
registrar SPreg. SPreg saves these requests in an additional column of Alice’s identity record
(Table I). If the federation accepts a threshold of three then when the third such request is
received the SPreg revokes this attribute. The revocation steps thenceforth follow steps 4 to 6
of the protocol for the revocation of certiﬁed attributes (see Figure 5). Further usage of possibly
incorrect uncertiﬁed attributes is thus prevented. Similar revocation procedure can be adopted
if a strongly authenticated6 user requests revocation of his/her attribute.
The notiﬁcation mechanism described above for certiﬁed SIT attributes corresponds to apull mode
for revocation notiﬁcation. This is a request reply mechanism where the reply is valid when it is from
an authorized CA. In the case of OCSP, revocation information can also be from an authorized OCSP
responder [33]. As highlighted earlier one problem is that the requester SP should know which OCSP
responder it should contact to get the revocation information. One approach to address this issue is to
deﬁne a push mode revocation notiﬁcation where the main CA pushes the revocation notiﬁcation to
the federation SP’s when a revocation event occurs. Here the SP’s themselves play the role of OCSP
responders and the revocation information requests can be satisﬁed within the federation. To support
such solution we deploy an additional DHT (referred to as revoke-DHT for clarity) with the SP’s as the
distributed nodes. The revoke-DHT key in this case is the certiﬁcate ID itself. An external CA has to
notify any one of the SP’s in the federation. As an example in Figure 6 SP2 is notiﬁed about the certiﬁcate
6Strong authentication is when more than one factors were used to authenticate the user.
18identiﬁed by certiﬁcate IDcid. SP2 computes the revoke-DHT hash H(cid) to identify the DHT node
(SP5 in this case) where this cid should be stored. Subsequently it sends the revocation information to
SP5. Henceforth any SP which needs revocation information about certiﬁcatecid can directly access SP5
by computing the same hash, thus identifying the DHT node responsible for providing cid’s revocation
information. This solves the problem of identifying the OCSP responders outside the federation.
Note the hash values can be pre-computed and stored in the AIA7 extension’s accessLocation ﬁeld
of the certiﬁcate [33]. This parameter essentially stores the location of the OCSP responder. AIA extension
conﬁguration is very useful, but it has to be done carefully since improper use of certiﬁcate extensions has
led to severe deployment problems [26]. Therefore instead of adding this information into the certiﬁcate
we can leverage the knowledge of the revoke-DHT’s hash function to calculate the responder at runtime.
This information can also be cached locally in the system. In this way we provide two alternative methods
which can be used to implement OCSP for certiﬁed SIT attributes.
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
We now analyze the security and complexity of the SIT protocols. In particular we assess identity theft
protection in the presence of malicious parties and communication costs. Before starting the analysis
we present an interesting paradox based on the desired properties for identity theft protection in the
federation. The two required properties are as follows:
Property 1: Identity Hiding. Given f(x), it is infeasible to compute the value of x.
Property 2: Duplicate Detection. Given f(x) and f(y) identify the case when x = y.
The ﬁrst property is required so that the registrar SP, which stores the committed values of the user is
not able to compute the actual secret value. If that SP could compute the values, the registration process
could be simpliﬁed by storing all the values in clear. However, if such SP is compromised so are all the
SIT attributes. The second property is required to prevent duplicates of sensitive identiﬁer commitments
in the federation. This requirement is needed to prevent a malicious user from registering stolen attributes
with his/her identiﬁer. It is interesting to observe that property 2 enables one to launch a brute force
dictionary attack. This is a realistic attack for most identiﬁers. For instance a SSN is composed of 9 digits,
therefore it has 109 < 230 possible SSN’s. Listing 230 possible strings for a 30 bit value is not difﬁcult
for an adversary with moderate computational resources. It is not obvious how padding or randomization
can be added in a useful manner.
7Authority Info Access.
19To solve this problem we suggest that each strong identiﬁer be appended with weak identiﬁers
associated with it. For example a credit card number can be appended with expiry date and name. This
results in a longer length of this committed proof of identity, which in turn raises the bar for the brute
force attack. The probability of forgery in Protocols 1 and 2 is 1=2t where t is the security parameter.
This parameter is useful to determine how many weak identiﬁers will need to be appended to a given
strong identiﬁer. A more general solution, however, is an open problem which may be solvable using
innovative cryptographic techniques and security models. One possible direction would be to investigate
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based zero-knowledge proofs [5], [32] where the intractability of the
original discrete log problem [43] is exactly the same, although ECC typically provides good security
with small secrets and little processing.
A. Identity Theft Protection in the Presence of Malicious Parties
We now prove some relevant properties of the SIT attribute registration and the SIT attribute usage
protocol. As illustrated in Example 3 a federation is mainly composed by three kinds of entity: the user;
the registrar SPreg; and the SPprov which will be providing the service. In our analysis, we assume that
the SPreg is semi-honest, unless stated otherwise. The following two theorems prove the correctness and
conﬁdentiality properties of the registration protocol. By correctness we mean that an honest user can
execute the protocol successfully thus achieving the speciﬁed results. By conﬁdentiality we mean privacy
preservation of the registered user attributes.
Theorem 1 Let U be a user and let Attr be the set of attributes U wishes to protect. Protocol 1 ensures
registration attributes Attr to be identity-protected, even in the presence of malicious users.
PROOF. We prove that a malicious user cannot compromise a honest user SIT attribute registration.
Two possible cases arise: i) U registers a set of attributes before a malicious user tries to re-register a
subset of those attributes with his/her actual attributes instead, ii) U registers a set of attributes after a
malicious user has registered U’s stolen attributes.
In case i), after the honest user has successfully registered his/her SIT attributes, a malicious user will
not be able to re-register those attributes with his/her own SSO ID. This is ensured by the duplicate
detection mechanism given in Section IV-C. Here, we assume that the exact value of the committed
sensitive attribute is important for the validity of the attribute. Therefore when the adversary attempts to
re-register the commitment will look identical to the one sent by the honest user. The registrar service
provider detects this duplicate and hence denies the registration.
20In case ii), attributes are obviously SIT attributes only after they are registered. If the user tries to
register with any SP in the federation, like in case (i), a duplicate is detected and physical veriﬁcation
is requested by the SP. In this case only the actual attribute owner (user U) can give a valid in-person
proof. As a result, once the fraud has been detected, U can re-register the values successfully. The thesis
thus holds.
Theorem 2 The SIT attribute registration protocol satisﬁes conﬁdentiality.
PROOF. We prove that the actual sensitive values of the registered attributes is not revealed even to
the registrar SPreg. This result is directly related to the hiding property of Schnorr’s ZKPOK protocol.
The key assumption is that the Discrete Log Problem [31]8 is hard for a polynomially bound adversary.
If the length of the committed attribute is more than sixteen bits, then by current standards it is infeasible
for an adversary to launch a dictionary attack to guess the value of the committed value or compute the
discrete log. The actual secret of the commitment thus remains conﬁdential.
Corollary 2 Let U be a user and let Attr be the set of attributes registered by U at SP reg. A registrar
SP reg cannot infer other attributes related with Attr.
Sketch of Proof. It has been shown in [46] how combining attribute information about a user can help
infer his/her other not disclosed attributes. Because the actual values of the attributes remain conﬁdential
even to SPreg, we see that it is not possible to infer other attribute information from the set of committed
values. The only values given in clear are the tags associated with the given commitments. These tags
are required to be generic so that they do not leak information about the corresponding secret attribute.
For example instead of having a tag Purdue-Student-ID the tag should be Afﬁliated-Institution-ID . Here
the latter generic tag does not have the speciﬁc identiﬁers likePurdue and Student. There is no other
information in clear which could leak information; therefore inferring information about the user is hard.
The above result can be strengthened with a small variation to the protocol proposed in Section IV-A.
Instead of leaving the attribute tags in clear it is possible to hide them using hashing functions. The
actual tag values will thus be known only to the user and never revealed to anyone. Inference in this
case is impossible. We do not use such approach in the current version of our protocols because, in most
cases, inference carried out by tag analysis is not signiﬁcant and does not violate privacy of the users.
8Given a multiplicative group (G;¤), an element g in G having order n and an element y in the subgroup generated by g,
we have to ﬁnd the unique integerx such that g
xmod n = y. Here x is the discrete logarithm loggy.
21Also, an hybrid approach where some of the attributes tags are hidden (typically the most sensitive or
less generic ones) is possible.
The next two theorems prove the correctness and conﬁdentiality of the SIT attribute usage protocol. By
correctness of SIT attribute usage protocol we mean that the proofs of identity can be used successfully
to prove ownership of the attributes required by the SPprov. Only after this proof is executed, does
SPprov obtain the required attributes. Correctness of the SIT attribute usage protocol ensures mitigation
of identity theft. By conﬁdentiality we mean that the protocol is privacy-preserving with respect to the
user attributes such that none of the SP’s learn more information than required about the user.
Theorem 3 Let U be a user and SPprov be the service provider U interacts with. SIT attribute usage
protocol is correct if and only if at least one of the interacting parties is semi-honest.
PROOF. To prove that SIT attribute usage protocol is secure we need consider two cases:
i) U is malicious and SPprov is semi-honest.
ii) SPprov is malicious and U is semi-honest.
Case i). A malicious user cannot provide the commitment corresponding the the different proofs
of identity required by the SPprov’s policies. We assume that not all the sensitive SIT attributes are
compromised. Due to incorrect commitments the symmetric key exchange in Protocol 2 fails. Referring
to the protocol, the malicious user could easily articulate y0 using the equation: f(gy0
¤ce)¡dgmod p = k
used by the SPprov in step 6 to exchange a symmetric key successfully. However, y can only be veriﬁed if
the user knows the secret using the original ZKPOK. Therefore this protocol is secure against a malicious
user.
Case ii). In our context a malicious SPprov is a SP wishing to use SIT attributes of the user without
verifying the identity proofs. This not possible because of the format of the ﬁnal message disclosed by
the user (see Figure 4). Protocol 2 for key exchange is successful if and only if the committed value
is veriﬁed correctly withSPreg, for each such attribute. The messages are encoded in a nested manner
such that only after decrypting with the keys corresponding to the proofs of identity can the SPprov
retrieve the required user attributes. This forces the SPprov to follow the protocol and prevent misuse of
an honest user SIT attributes.
It is important to notice that in Protocol 2 we require at least one party between the user and the
service providing SP is semi-honest during the message exchanges. The worst case arises when the
22registrar and another SP in the federation collude. In this case, we cannot prevent the leak of information
such that the registrar collects clear attributes from SP0
provs. However since we consider multi-factor
authentication, which requires proofs of other additional sensitive identiﬁers, the leaked attributes cannot
be used successfully without the knowledge of the other users’ ids. For example, to use a CCN, a user
needs to prove that it has the knowledge of her SSN. Eventually, the user reveals the CCN which is
required for the service (and not SSN). If the dishonest SP reveals the CCN value to the registrar the
actual value of the SSN is still a secret and therefore the SSN cannot be used as proof of identity in
subsequent transactions.
We do not consider a malicious-malicious case since an active malicious user and malicious service
provider can agree on not following the protocol.
However, for passive malicious or faulty systems (corresponding to SP’s or users) some mitigation
techniques can be discussed. An extension on this topic is part of our future work.
Theorem 4 The SIT attribute usage protocol satisﬁes conﬁdentiality.
PROOF. SPprov is not required to learn any information about the sensitive attributes used as proofs of
identity in the SIT attribute usage protocol. Only the tag corresponding to the identity proof is given to
SPprov to query SPreg and retrieve the corresponding commitment. This tag as speciﬁed earlier has to be
generic to avoid leaking any secret information. If SPprov can get the value of the secret identiﬁer in the
commitment, then it would be equivalent to solving the DLP problem. This contradicts our assumption
that DLP is hard. Therefore information about the SIT attributes as proofs of identity remains conﬁdential
to the SPprov type SP’s.
In addition, the illustrated protocols are secure against man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. This is
because of four main reasons. First, any message sent from the user to the SP is encrypted with the public
key of the SP. Second, an explicit naming convention [1] is used by including the SSO ID of the sender.
Third, timestamps are used to maintain freshness of the messages. Finally, the challenges sent by the SP
are random9 and cannot be predicted. For the ﬁnal message if an adversary could successfully replay
this message then it could essentially use the SIT attribute with the attached proofs of identity. This is
not possible because the symmetric keys are generated in response to random challenges sent by the SP
and the proofs of identity. Interestingly, in this manner even the SPprov which successfully retrieves the
9Note that these random challenges can be made non-interactive assuming a random oracle model [6] but this is outside the
scope of the paper.
23user’s SIT attributes as required cannot maliciously use them with any other SP. The timestamps in the
ﬁnal message also prevents timing and replay attacks. Note that timestamps can be replaced by counters
or nounces, as suitable for the federation environment.
B. Complexity Analysis
The complexity cost is estimated in terms of the number and sizes of messages exchanged among
SP’s and users. In the registration phase the Protocol 1 is executed for each registered SIT attribute. The
number of messages exchanged for each iteration is four. The sizes of these messages are in log (p)
or log (q) depending of the modulus. For Protocol 2 in the attribute usage protocol, the number of
messages exchanged is ﬁve. Furthermore, let n be the number of proofs of identity required to gain
assurance regarding the validity of a user, and m be the number of required attributes. Then the number
of times Protocol 2 has to be run is N = n + m. The sizes of most messages are of the same order of
the sizes of the messages exchanged during the registration phase. The size of the ﬁnal message after all
iterations of Protocol 2 are executed is proportional to N, and the number of nested encrypted messages
is N. If symmetric cipher AES is used in the CBC mode [4], then the size of each nested block is
at least 128 bits. As one cipher block is added with each encryption the size of the ﬁnal message is
approximately 128£N bits. The registrar SPreg acts like a database of information, and thus it does not
represent a bottleneck in the system. To enhance efﬁciency, Protocol 1’s multiple attributes registration
can be executed in parallel because the commitments are independent of each other. Similarly Protocol
2’s multiple symmetric key retrieval can also be made parallel and according to any order.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section we ﬁrst explore the most relevant federated digital identity management initiatives and
then solutions to the identity theft problem in federations. We also compare our work to some known
cryptographic schemes namely anonymous credential and identity based encryptions.
In the corporate world there are several emerging standards for identity federation like Liberty Alliance
[24] (LA) and WS-Federation. Because the projects are very similar we describe the former in more detail.
LA is based on SAML and provides open standards for SSO with decentralized authentication. SSO allows
a user to sign-on once at a Liberty-enabled site in order to be seamlessly signed-on when navigating to
another site without the need to authenticate again. This group of Liberty-enabled sites is a part of what is
called a circle of trust, which is a federation of SP’s and identity providers having business relationships
based on the Liberty architecture. The identity provider is a Liberty-enabled entity that creates, maintains
24and manages identity information of users and gives this information to the SP’s. As compared to LA
which uses PKI for user authentication, we show how we can also leverage the SSO ID for establishing
from simple to complex digital user attributes. This adds privacy, ﬂexibility and usability to the identity
system. In addition our speciﬁc identity theft protection protocols can prove valuable when used in the
Liberty identity federation framework.
Shibboleth [25] is an initiative by universities that are members of Internet2. The goal of such initiative
is to develop and deploy new middleware technologies that can facilitate inter-institutional collaboration
and access to digital contents. It uses the concept of federation of user attributes. When a user at an
institution tries to use a resource at another, Shibboleth sends attributes about the user to the remote
destination, rather than making the user log into that destination, thus enabling a seamless access. The
receiver can check whether the attributes satisfy its own policies. Our approach differs with respect to
Shibboleth in that we do not rely on a central identity provider providing all user attributes. User attributes
in our framework are distributed within the different federation members, each of which can effectively be
an identity provider. We also provide a mechanism by using which a user can receive certiﬁed attributes
from the federation members and use them to obtain further certiﬁed information.
Concerning the problem of identity theft, LA, Shibboleth project and other organizations like Better
Business Bureau and Federal Trade Commission have initiated some efforts aiming at educating con-
sumers and preventing identity theft. A LA paper [18] points out that the use of SSO in federations
helps reducing ID theft by reducing the number of login names and passwords which might be related to
other user attribute information. The paper also discusses how attribute sharing in a federation inherently
prevents user attributes theft “by controlling the scope of access to participating websites, by enabling
consent-driven, secure, cross-domain transmission of a users personal information.” LA mitigates ID
theft by having the organizations in the federation adopt superior standards of security by distributing
information in order to avoid single point of failure, by having access control on these attributes based
on user preferences, and by coordinating response to incidents and frauds. However to the best of our
knowledge no identity provision protocols to mitigate ID theft have been developed. In particular, none
of the proposed techniques in LA takes into account the case of not completely trusted members. Also
LA approach currently does not address the problem of impersonation attacks where an attacker attempts
to use stolen identiﬁers to commit fraud. Solutions dealing with such case would provide protection
against insider threat or when a SP is compromised. Our solution not only exploits the advantages of a
federation, as the general usage case, but extends it even further with the concept of SIT attributes and
25SIT attribute usage.
RSA Laboratories’ product Nightingale [34] implements a secret-splitting technology, which is designed
to be integrated into application software as a server module for the back-end of any network. Secret
splitting is a cryptographic technique that breaks a piece of data into two components. Learning one of
these components reveals no information about the original data. Using secret-splitting the sensitive data
is cryptographically distributed across two locations - the Nightingale module/server and an application
server thus avoiding a single point of failure. The secret data can be of three types: (1) user authentication
data like SSN, passwords; (2) business data like customer records and their CCN; (3) the cryptographic
keys them-self. Nightingale can thus be used to mitigate identity theft by making it hard to retrieve the
stored user information. Interestingly, the secret splitting can be used with the solution proposed in this
paper to split the committed values of user identity attributes. Such an approach may provide even better
identity theft protection which we will explore as a part of our future work.
Several privacy-enabled identity management systems have been based on the notion of anonymous
credential [12], [13]. In anonymous credential systems, organizations know the users only by pseudonyms.
Different pseudonyms of the same user cannot be linked. Yet, an organization can issue a credential to a
pseudonym, and the corresponding user can prove possession of this credential to another organization
(who knows her by a different pseudonym), without revealing anything more than the fact that she owns
such a credential [19]. The main idea regarding use of pseudonyms in IdM systems is in that “the
identity provider generates an opaque handle that serves as the name identiﬁer the service provider and
the identity provider use in referring to the user when communicating with each other” [39]. Rudimentary
non-linkability is achieved, since an outside observer cannot infer any information about the actual user
based on the random session based opaque handles. The ﬁrst approach that proposed to replace user
identiﬁers by pseudonyms is by Chaum [14]; the key idea was to use one time pseudonyms for a series
of transactions to provide unlinkability among different transactions with organizations, yet at the same
time transfer certiﬁed attributes among these organizations. A credential system was also employed, to
ensure that only the information required for the transaction is revealed on a need to know basis.
Idemix [12] is the ﬁrst system implementing anonymous credentials in a federated identity management
system. Idemix provides mechanisms for efﬁcient multi-show10 credentials and a ﬂexible scheme for
issuing and revoking anonymous credentials. It also provides a mechanism for all or nothing sharing and
10Credentials can be used multiple times. Possession of a multi-show credential can be demonstrated an arbitrary number of
times; these demonstrations cannot be linked to each other [12].
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certiﬁed attributes. Therefore anonymous credentials are not adequate for several real e-commerce appli-
cations since most of interactions rely on use of uncertiﬁed attributes. Moreover, anonymous interactions
are not possible for most web services that require strong identiﬁers. We differ from these approaches
in that we do not hide the user identity even if we protect his/her identity attributes. More speciﬁcally,
we do not only protect user privacy but also protect the use of its strong identiﬁers without requiring
anonymity.
Table II presents comparison between various anonymous credential schemes [12], [13] and our
proposed SIT IdM approach according to some fundamental criteria. Two speciﬁc criteria dealing with
identity theft addressed in our work are strong authentication and federation duplicate detection which
to the best of our knowledge are not covered by anonymous credential schemes. Strong authentication
is when the authentication requires at least two forms of identiﬁers. Detection of duplicate registration
of strong identiﬁers is also a mechanism to timely prevent identity theft as elaborated in this paper.
For completeness we now describe another direction that has been followed by researchers to address
phishing attacks which can potentially cause identity theft. This is the notion of Identity Base Encryption
(IBE) which was ﬁrst introduced and deﬁned by Shamir in 1984 [42] and then extended by several
other researchers [3], [9], [37]. An IBE scheme is a public-key cryptosystem in which any string is a
valid public key. In particular, email addresses and dates can be public keys [10]. The private key is
then computed by a master authority in possession of the master secret, and delivered to the proper user
after proper authentication, usually via a separate channel. As a result, parties may encrypt messages or
verify signatures with no prior distribution of keys to individual participants. This is extremely useful in
cases in which pre-distribution of authenticated keys is inconvenient or not feasible because of technical
constraints. However, to decrypt or sign messages, the authorized user must obtain the appropriate private
key from the private key generator. A caveat of this approach is that this private key generator must be
highly trusted.
In the approach by Adida et al. [3] the IBE is used to deﬁne and implement a cross domain identity-
based ring signatures. The ring structure of these signatures provides repudiability. With identity-based
public keys, a full PKI is no longer required. Separability allows ring constructions across different
identity-based master key domains. Together, these properties make signature constructions a possible
solution to the email spooﬁng problem. Our approach greatly differs from the IBE schemes because
we do not provide a mechanism to encrypt data or manage certiﬁcates. Instead we focus on providing
27Criteria Anonymous Credential Scheme [12], [13] Proposed SIT IdM Scheme
Digital
Identity
Pseudonyms, PKI-based anonymous credentials,
primary focus on weak identiﬁers .
PKI-based credentials, uncertiﬁed attributes , SIT at-
tributes, primary focus on strong identiﬁers .
Privacy Provides mechanism for minimal attributes dis-
closure from a user credential and provable un-
linkability.
Based on IdM built in policies for minimal attribute dis-
closure and basic unlinkability based on handles. Privacy
preserving multi-factor using ZKPOK of strong identiﬁers.
Anonymity Provides provable unlinkability, multi-show cre-
dentials and is mainly based on disclosure of
weak identiﬁers.
Simple unlinkabilty based on IdM architecture (IdP’s and
SP’s), the federation privacy policies and protocols based
on the use of opaque handles. User is not anonymous in
the case of disclosure of strong identiﬁers.
Strong
Authentication
Authentication depends on a single PKI based
cryptographic secret for underlying ZKPOK
therefore does not provide strong authentication.
Authentication depends on multiple non-PKI based secrets




No mechanism to detect duplicate registration of
strong identiﬁers is provided.
Duplicate detection based on DHT to identify incorrect
registration of strong identiﬁers.
Accountability Provides global anonymity revocation mecha-
nism which reveals user identity if she misuses
her credentials. This is the PKI-assured non-
transferability property. PKI based signatures and
ZKPOK provides mechanism for provability.
Despite uncertiﬁed attributes accountability is provided by
multi-factor authentication of strong identiﬁers. ZKPOK
binding property provides mechanism for provability.
Conﬁdentiality Provides provable unlinkability, multi show of
credentials property by which even when SP’s
collude no user information is leaked.
Linking of data is possible if SP’s collude who have strong
identiﬁers of a user. However due to multi-factor ZKPOK
the user’s personal data cannot be used. Conﬁdentiality
of data also depends on the security of the IdP databases
containing the user attributes and the privacy policies.
Integrity Unforgeability of credentials is ensured based on
the assumption of strength of RSA.
Integrity is ensured based on both the binding property of
the ZKPOK and on the strong RSA assumption.
Deployment
Environment
PKI-based open distributed environment with
external certiﬁcation authority. PKI-enabled fed-
eration is included.
Federated IdM system. Public keys for SP’s desired but not
required for protocols. No external certiﬁcation required.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF ANONYMOUS CREDENTIAL SCHEME AND SIT IDM SCHEME
the infrastructure and methodologies to protect the identity of a user from misuse. Typically in IBE the
public information, like the email address, is assumed to be correct and is denoted as the identity of the
receiver. There is no clear methodology to verify and guarantee if this public information is correct and
really belongs to the intended recipient. Therefore the problem of identity theft is not addressed. It will
be interesting to investigate, as a part of future work, how IBE can be incorporated in our infrastructure.
This might strengthen the IBE scheme by ensuring strong authentication and identity theft protection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a ﬂexible and privacy-preserving approach that allows a user to establish
a unique identiﬁer and then proceed to establish other complex identity attributes in a federation. Our
approach relaxes the dependence on PKI for user authentication which is currently a bottleneck for many
trust management solutions. We also presented a novel solution to the problem of identity theft based
28on cryptographic techniques. In the paper we have also analyzed the security and complexity of the
proposed protocols. The analysis also highlights the assumptions and properties that are required in order
to implement the given identity theft protection solution.
Our future work includes moving from a context characterized by the semi-honest paradigm to a
context where malicious SP’s can collude with each other and the development of techniques to detect
misbehavior. Moreover we will investigate in detail the problem of ﬂexible and secure on-line registration
as mentioned in Section IV-A.2. As pointed out, preventing a malicious user to enroll using an honest
user’s identity if that honest user has not registered is a major issue. Currently, this is only fully prevented
if we mandate physical registration. We will design mechanisms to achieve such assurance even in case
of on-line registration.
We will also explore how other cryptographic techniques can be integrated with the one presented
in the paper. To this extent we will investigate the three cryptographic tools described in the related
work section. First we will focus on how secret splitting protocol might be an additional mechanism
to avoid a single point of failure in an IdM system. Second is with respect to anonymous credentials,
where we plan to investigate how they can be used to provide the proofs of strong identity which is the
primary requirement of our solution. Lastly we plan to investigate how the IBE scheme can use our multi-
factor authentication to guarantee that the public information used for encryption is valid. In conclusion,
we believe that our approach encourages the development of innovative cryptographic techniques and
applications to address security and privacy problems in digital identity management.
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